

Foucault and the Architecture of Surveillance: Creating Regimes of Power in Schools, Shrines, and Society

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Michel Foucault's critical studies concerning regimes of power are of special interest when applied to architecture. In particular, he warned of the hazards of building surveillance into architectural structures for the purpose of monitoring people and took as his historical exemplar English philosopher Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon," a structure originally used to assist in rehabilitating prisoners. He felt this kind of regulatory control resulted in maintaining power of one group over another. This article discusses what Foucault called the general ordering of the visible and the invisible by examining architecture as he viewed it—as an operation of power, control, and domination. More to the point, it places this belief in the context of power constructions in both sacred and school architecture and how this, in turn, creates a carceral society. This article also puts forward some of Foucault's thinking on architecture and connects this to his ideas of perceptual visibles and invisibles. The suggestion of schools as institutions of conformity and how their built environment functions as a regulatory force for this conformity is also explored.

All knowledge rests upon injustice.

(Foucault 1977, p. 163)

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

For many people in this post-September 11th age of anxiety about personal safety in public spaces, the students and teachers in the Biloxi, Mississippi school district

appear to be a particularly fortunate lot (eSchool News, 2003). More than five-hundred video surveillance cameras are installed in its schools across the district. These cameras are ceiling-mounted, dome-like structures affording panoramic views of classrooms and everything that occurs within them. For some, especially parents, this kind of security design provides a sense of satisfaction and relief; but for others, including the Mississippi American Federation of Teachers, troubling questions arise. Issues such as teacher rapport with students, privacy, suppression of academic creativity and spontaneity, and the inability of parents, teachers, and students to view the recordings without a court order have often been suggested as disturbing byproducts. Not unexpectedly, because of the increasing presence of similarly school-sanctioned surveillance devices on campuses across the United States, these same kinds of concerns have cropped up in communities leading to fears and protests about criminalizing the school environment and the architectural trend of making schools look more like juvenile detention facilities than learning environments (New York Civil Liberties Union [NYCLU] and American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] 2007). Why is it that well-intentioned, seemingly defensible practices such as this one prompt a sometimes angry analogy between schools and prisons? Perhaps it is because, as Glancey (2006) proposed,

This is a lovely thought, the architecture of the school itself working as a friendly and inspiring educational tool. For those of us educated in what we knew as "prison camps," the idea is almost impossible to fathom. School buildings were like the St Custard's of Nigel Molesworth, clearly designed by lunatics, presumably in the hope of crushing any sign of individuality or creativity from the young people trapped inside their distinctly unwelcoming doors. (p. 5)

This talk of crushing individuality and creativity and of being trapped has found special resonance in the works of Michel Foucault.

In addressing these questions, this article first presents what Foucault (1972) called the general ordering of the visible and the invisible by examining their "archaeology" (p. 7). Goethe stated "that what we know we have first seen" what Foucault would call the "visible" (Shapiro, 2003). Foucault, feeling that Western society privileges the visual, employs art and architecture as visibles to support this specific perspective. As one illustration of the potential of architectural design to function as a source of power, the Panopticon is introduced. Other historical art and architectural referents, both Western and non-Western, are offered as additional exemplars of how the visual environment can serve as intensifiers of power, including the temple of Rajaraja I, constructed by a powerful late tenth/early eleventh century ruler in south India.

Following this backdrop, the article turns to a discussion of surveillance increasingly designed into today's school architecture, this set within the postmodern

context of power constructions defined by Foucault (1995) as

enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded, . . . in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined. . . . all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism. (p. 197)

Issues of school disciplinary practice, the use and abuse of surveillance mechanisms to code discipline, and the urgency that this has assumed in the aftermath of events at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999 and Virginia Tech in 2007, to name two of the most prominent, are raised. This line of thinking is in keeping with themes recurring throughout Foucault's *oeuvre*, where he discusses the reach of power, the limits of knowledge, and the foundations of modern government (Miller 1993). Within this previous sentence, one senses a commingling of sociology, psychology, and psychiatry, what Foucault (1972) in his work called "the human sciences" (p. 173). It was these human sciences, he felt, that created regimes of power because they defined *norms*. By positing what is *normal*, human sciences then can structure abnormality and deviation, encouraging what Foucault (1995) further identified as "disciplinary partitioning" (p. 199), something that outraged him.

But was he right to be so outraged? How accurate was his perception of the past and its sins? How do we treat security with expectations of individual privacy and protection? How far will society go to ensure personal safety, and what kinds of security measures, especially those powered by technology, will find acceptance in a postmillennial society? These are among the questions that are now probed.

FOUCAULT AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF VISION

A useful way to establish some beginning context is to examine Foucault's concept of the *archaeology* of knowledge, especially his archaeology of vision. For him, archaeology is directed "primarily toward describing how the disciplines that establish truth are constituted in a variety of contexts and cultures" (Shapiro 2003, 266). The process of archaeology excavates and uncovers grids of knowledge to find the historical and fundamental codes of culture. Foucault's primary concern was the understanding of how, why, and when some beliefs are held as true, and how and why society classifies *knowledge*. In one sense, *archaeology* corresponds to its popular definition, that is the process of identifying artifacts and their use within a culture. But the layers run deeper for Foucault. As an archaeologist of the visual, Foucault "aims at showing us what is distinctive about the way that a certain epoch structures the relation between the visible and the invisible,




FIGURE 1 Velázquez, Diego, *Las Meninas*, 1656, Oil on canvas, 10'5" × 9'1", Museo del Prado, Madrid.

what is seen and what is said" (Shapiro 2003, 235). As a medium for examining how specific epochs were shaped by the visual, Foucault used iconic paintings because he believed human society privileges observation, something he labeled "ocularcentrism" (Shapiro, 2003, 6). One well-known example is his interpretation of the Spanish artist Diego Velázquez's most celebrated work, *Las Meninas* or *The Maids of Honor* (Figure 1). Whitmore (1997) described the work:

The painting represents the artist himself at work on a large canvas, only the back of which is visible. In the front center is the princess Margarita and her maids. On a mirror hung in the background are the faces of the King and Queen, looking straight back into their reflection, or possibly looking at us, the viewers, as it were. Aside from this “reflected” image, the King and Queen are not visible to us. The painting evokes the reciprocity of looking: we can look at the painting, and it in effect looks back at us. However, is it looking at us, or are we standing in the place of the King and Queen who are reflected in the mirror on the opposite wall? The value of Valasquez’s [sic] painting for Foucault lies in the fact that it introduces uncertainties in visual representation at a time when the image and paintings in general were looked upon as “windows onto the world.” Foucault finds that *Las Meninas* was a very early critique of the supposed power of representation to confirm an objective order visually. (n.p.)

To make his case even stronger, Foucault (1966) refused to offer a reading of the work that would only conform to the visibles that one superficially sees within the work because, in Foucault’s mind, sight becomes its own impediment (Igrek 2005). Such a reading, he implied, “would have the effect of distracting us from seeing the painting in its archaeological specificity, as it displays the signature mode of its epoch” (Shapiro 2003, 235). Vision, like power, embodies specific historical practices. Within a Foucauldian analysis, the task is not so much to familiarize the work for the observer but to defamiliarize it, making newly puzzling that which was thought to be known thereby creating a sort of visual resistance. With agreed upon masterworks in art, there is a tendency to consume them not as visual documents but as monuments. This enshrinement of art works to a canon of greatness that only prevents succeeding generations from reordering its signs, recoding its meaning, and rediscovering its ever-changing truths.

THE PANOPTICON: THE UNBLINKING EYE AND A ‘CARCERAL SOCIETY’

Many of these same streams of thought about the archaeological discontinuity of the visual, as exemplified by art, drove Foucault’s interpretation of the use and abuse of architecture. In Foucault’s version, some forms of architecture were malevolent and others were more beneficial. He singled out the invention of the Panopticon (Figure 2) by Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) as emblematic of a carceral society, a society of malicious social arrangement. The Panopticon is a prison that is built radially, so that one guard positioned in its center can view all prisoners. Foucault mapped out the origins of the Panopticon, indeed the origins for all disciplinary measures, back to the plague in Europe. The seventeenth-century epidemic created a society that was forced to become highly ordered mostly for the purposes of quarantine and




FIGURE 2 A Model of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon.

purification. It was in this very strict ordering process, separating lepers from the community-at-large, that a “carceral” system was created. Foucault’s use of the term carceral is distinctive. First found in his work *Surveiller et Punir* (*Discipline and Punish* 1995), it refers to the failure as a whole of the prison system to reform and its desire to regulate. The Panopticon, an outgrowth of this carceral system, was created by Bentham as a means of easy and cheap supervision. Derived from a plan found in the Parisian military school l’École Militaire, the Panopticon was planned as a form of prison architecture in which a central tower built into a structure allowed constant, permanent, and unobstructed visibility of the activities of inmates while inspectors are hidden from inmate view (<http://www.ncl.ac.uk/connectingprinciple/projects/wpfilm.htm>). Because of this, prisoners (or *objects*, as Foucault called them) were unaware of whether or not

they were being observed, demonstrating, conceptually, the principle of *invisible omniscience*. The thinking behind this was that if prisoners were aware that they were being watched (i.e., controlled) they may begin to reflect on how they might rehabilitate their criminal behaviors (Foucault 1995). In effect, the prison became a seeing machine, a transparent building in which the reparative gaze of power was under the control of a few but, ostensibly, these few symbolized society as a whole. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1995) elaborated on this design. He wrote,

All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower, and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of the backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The Panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. (p. 200)

The rationale of this form of punishment was in confiscating not only body but soul. Correction attempted to *reset* the soul back to a state of obedience by introducing new habits. It did not try to restore or rehabilitate the individual back to the place in society that he had lost by transgression, but sought rather to create a subject who conformed, obeying unquestioningly and unhesitatingly.

Further, Shah and Kesan (2007) observed that “Foucault’s analysis found that the ideal of the panopticon is reflected in other forms of architecture from hospitals, asylums, military camps, and schools. The essential element was the use of architecture with a theme of continuous surveillance and the feeling of general visibility. The promise of the panopticon was that it could ‘transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them’” (p. 12). Even though the design of the Panopticon was never fully realized during Bentham’s time (it, literally, never got off the drawing board), Foucault (1995) used this conceptual design in *Discipline and Punish* as a metaphor for society’s disciplinary capacity and a hierarchical network that created what he describes as a “dystopian unfreedom.”

FOUCAULT AND SOVEREIGN POWER: SHRINES OF THE EAST

Foucault viewed power as derived from two specific categories: sovereign and disciplinary. In the first part of *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1995) spoke

of this sovereign power that is the power of a government or monarchy with their “nodes,” or agents, which can include a king, prince, or similar authority figure. These figures have the ability to assess taxes, wage war, and, in general, enforce penalties to display and consolidate political power. Foucault seemed to have been obsessed with presenting historical examples of this sovereign aspect of a power structure to detail many of his theories, with his exemplars derived, primarily, from the history of the West. These historical examples usually involve a catastrophe, his historical episodes of madness and examination of the plague being prominent examples. However, the history of the East, generally absent in Foucault’s exemplars, offers just as revealing a glance into the evolution of long-standing power structures in non-Western communities and found much earlier than some of their Western counterparts. It might be instructive, therefore, to examine them, because of their absence in Foucault’s work. This will help establish some additional historical and geographic perspective on Foucault’s discourses and broaden discussion.

The first example offered is the Temple of Rajaraja Chola, located in Thanjavur in south India. The Temple of Rajaraja I, or Brihadisvara temple (Figure 3) as it is also known is one of the wonders of the South Asian world. Constructed



FIGURE 3 The Temple of Rajaraja, (Brihadisvara), c. 1010 CE, Thanjavur, India.



FIGURE 4 Inscriptions on the wall of the Temple of Rajaraja.

in the eleventh century by one of India's greatest rulers, it stands today in a tradition that has utilized architecture as a metalanguage, a visual symbol of a power relationship between sovereign and subject. When Rajaraja Chola built the temple, or more appropriately a "temple-town," it was to commemorate his own military conquests by acknowledging the intercession of the gods, as well as to unify a disordered society, and enable wealth distribution among targeted subjects, thus establishing what Foucault called a society of "verticality" (Shapiro 2003, 322) because of the hierarchical nature of the template. Vasudevan analyzed some of the inscriptions (Figure 4) found on the temple's walls. She suggested that royal temples under the Cholas were instruments of sovereign power that helped to enhance and consolidate Chola hegemony over a vast empire (Vasudevan 2003). These inscriptions speak of the vast enterprises needed to run the temple, including the resources of both people and animals, and how Rajaraja I hoped the gods would look favorably upon the largesse that he demonstrated in maintaining the temple and expiate his sins of mass murder in various conflicts to guarantee him a good reincarnation. These large temples were constructed as visible manifestations or in Foucault's vocabulary, as an "intensifier" of power. Vasudevan (2003) wrote that these temples were used as "instruments of royal power to control the empire in

all ways. Rajaraja I approached the notion of this temple-town as a consolidation of his social, economic, religious, and political power" (p. 22).

So, what if Foucault had looked east? What would he make of a structure like Rajaraja's temple in the sense of its representation as a "discursive formation," defined as "a space of multiple dissensions; a set of different oppositions whose levels and roles must be described?" (Foucault 1972, 155). In building this primarily religious structure, the Indian ruler deliberately used it for extra-religious purposes. A large portion of the population was employed to maintain the temple and tend to its upkeep, but they were prevented from worshipping there. Because of this exclusion of what would be perceived as a lower working class, he might make a case for the temple as being perceived as a space mostly built for "intensification" of power and not horizontal conjunction in society. About this, Foucault (1972) wrote, "you make curious use of the freedom that you question in others. For you give yourself the whole field of a free space that you even refuse to qualify. . . . You have linked their slightest words to obligations that condemn their slightest innovation to conformity" (p. 208).

In this respect, the temple is but one in a long line of architectural "intensifiers" that can be traced from ancient Egyptian pharaonic temples to the "soft totalitarianism" of Perón in Argentina, Hitler in Germany, and Stalin in Russia. Betti (2006) noted that this softness is set within the context of manipulating mostly benign principles of aesthetics in the service of self-promotion and aggrandizement. She also pointed out that in the Perón era, social and political value of aesthetics was maximized and architecture was converted into political imagery. The objective was to manufacture an urban stage to inflate and glorify the image of the leader and present the civilization of the spectacle. The construction of these structures are all a part of what Shapiro (2003) labelled "visual regimes" (pp. 200–201), in which the "visuals" in a culture are connected to what it allows to be seen, by whom, and under what circumstances. He cited as a modern-day example the destruction, in 2001, of another type of shrine in the east, the giant Bamiyan Buddha statues in Afghanistan (Figure 5) by the Taliban allegedly under orders from their (ironically) one-eyed leader "Mullah" Omar as how the cycle of the civilization of the spectacle continues. But, in the eyes of Foucault, power differs from violence which is what the destruction of these Buddhist Bamiyan statues might be better characterized as. Power essentially alters relationships which affects people's actions. Violence destroys them.

It is well-known that Foucault was involved with this idea of a discourse of power as something mediated through language. Yet Shapiro (2003) asked whether it may be appropriate to question whether the archaeology of epistemic regimes "can be extended into the visual" (p. 270). Although Foucault's reasoning reveals the implicit discourse communicated by the built environment, his experience with archaeologies of modern institutions suggests other directions. He was not so much interested in the superficial connection of the simplified equation of big



FIGURE 5 “Bamiyan” Buddha in Afghanistan.

buildings equaling big power, but in what he identified as the *spatialization* of knowledge and power, architecture instigating societal problems. Equating the “bigness” of any structure with the scope of its power would be a superficial reading. For Foucault, it would be a misinterpretation to hold that architecture is merely surrogate power, or that architecture can have political significance. Rather,

as Hays (2000) argued, “it is the techniques for practicing social relations, which are framed and modulated spatially, that allow for the efficient expansion of power or, alternatively, for resistance” (p. 428).

FOUCAULT AND DISCIPLINARY POWER: SCHOOLS AND SURVEILLANCE

This idea of architecture as a instrument of control leads to the next section on school architecture and how this architecture can also serve as an intensifier of power, much in the same vein as the previously cited temple of Rajaraja. Perhaps more than any other social institution, schools create a regime of power by defining norms. By setting out to use disciplinary power to promote what is normal, abnormality and deviation are, *de facto*, defined, resulting in Foucault's (1995) “binary division” (p. 199). These practices include both sovereign and disciplinary power. Disciplinary power is distinct from sovereign power in the sense that it is much more diffuse. Where sovereign power generally emanates through visible “nodes,” as was the case with India's Rajaraja, disciplinary power is far more subtle and, more important, less visible and less attributable. People are being shaped, but are unaware of the shaping. With disciplinary power various segments of living are permeated, and because many of these sources go undetected, the individual is unaware of being under surveillance. This is an especially significant component of surveillance structures of schools.

Surprisingly, Foucault has had fairly little to say, directly, about power construction in schools. Weems (2005) conjectured that Foucault would probably reject many standard academic practices, in particular disapproving of the establishment of any curriculum canon as categorically representative of any one culture's work. One overarching theme of Foucault's is his desire to invert the verticality of the power relationship and its *dispositif* or system, that is, to transform its direction from a vertical axis (top down) into a more horizontal (equally balanced) conjunction. Much of this desire to invert power can be traced back to Foucault's ideas on the power to confine. As mentioned earlier, he was acutely affected and dismayed by the historical practice of relegating the sick or insane to asylums or jails. To him, this kind of action was not corrective, but instead designed to discipline and sever. Foucault was particularly provoked by a practice in seventeenth-century England in which the execution of criminals became public entertainment, or as he identified it, the “spectacle of the scaffold.” Foucault (1995) lamented,

Every death agony expresses a certain truth; but when it takes place on the scaffold, it does so with more intensity, in that it is hastened by pain; with more rigour, because it occurs exactly at the juncture between the judgement of men and the judgement of God; with more ostentation because it takes place in public. . . . Hence the insatiable

curiosity that drove the spectators to the scaffold to witness the spectacle of the sufferings truly endured; there one could decipher crime and innocence, the past and the future, the here below and the eternal. (pp. 45–46)

For Foucault, school may be a space deliberately designed for supervising, hierarchizing, and rewarding. Under the “scrupulously classificatory eyes of the master,” students are placed in assigned spaces that they cannot leave except on the order of the school inspector (Foucault 1995, 147). This hierarchizing model continues with the seriation of school subjects. Foucault (1995) warned about the

disciplinary time that was gradually imposed on pedagogical practice. . . arranging different stages and, separated from one another by graded examinations, drawing up programmes, each of which must take place during a particular stage and which involves exercises of increasing difficulty. . . . Temporal dispersal is brought together to produce a profit, this mastering a duration that would otherwise elude one’s grasp. Power is articulated directly onto time; it assures control and guarantees its use. (pp. 159–160)

But now a rejoinder to this. Yes, schools are, by design, spaces where conformity is demanded, locations where hierarchical boundaries are agreed upon. It is built into the managerial infrastructure. But, in all fairness, can this be looked upon as anything, if not pragmatic? How, for example, can the safety and security of generally hundreds, if not thousands, of young people and adults be guaranteed if the institution in which they live does not practice hierarchizing and subject seriation? Of schools experiencing some sort of security compromise during the last several years, the killings at Columbine High School in Colorado in April, 1999, and those at Virginia Tech in April, 2007, are the most prominent and disturbing examples. Largely as a result of these events, schools have become increasingly concerned with securing their spaces and, consequently, the creation of a *surveillance curriculum* has made significant inroads. This curriculum generally involves the installation of video cameras and other high-tech devices that traverse the perimeter of a school campus, both its interior and exterior, sometimes embedded into the design and planning of many new schools. In effect, the watching becomes built into the structure. After a school shooting in Minnesota in 2005, one principal of a high school in the district where the incident occurred talked about preventative measures his school had taken. He stated, “I have eight cameras: four are inside and four of them are outside. . . . It’s a huge deterrent. The kids behave much better” (Stang 2005, n.p.). Usually these video cameras are monitored by a security force and their film is fed, in some cases, to screens in the principal’s or other administrator’s office. Foucault’s notions offer a perspective through which one may compare the installation of video cameras around a campus equivalent to the implementation of a high-tech version of Bentham’s Panopticon.

This influx of video surveillance in schools had also led to other troubling inspection issues. In August of 2006, schools in Boston banned the wearing of hoodies or hooded sweatshirts. The rationale motivating this practice resulted from the inability of a video camera to focus on the faces of students wearing a hoodie, especially when they are involved in altercations, acts of vandalism, or the like. Wearing a hoodie allows quick, anonymous exits from the school. This follows similar limits on hoodies in schools in New York and California (NYCLU/ACLU 2007). This kind of surveillance, which some school administrators may view as necessary to preempt or prevent any potential violent actions, would undoubtedly raise eyebrows in circles in which issues of privacy, personal choice, and confidentiality are privileged. The result of this sort of regulatory mechanism is a practice that, for some "contributes to the maintenance of power of one group over another and functions as a mechanism for coding their reciprocal relationships at a level that includes the movement of the body in space as well as its surveillance" (Lawrence & Low 1990, 485).

So the challenge appears to be how to strike a delicate balance between the need to surveil and the mission to instruct. A report by the American Architectural Foundation (2006) suggests that school architecture has become increasingly sensitive to the learning needs of students and has begun to integrate the surveillance needs with traditional school responsibilities. The report also notes that school architecture needs to acknowledge changes in teaching and learning styles of students and also mentions that, although school security is still a major design issue, steps are being taken to make it less overt and intrusive, less prison-like. Take, for example, places such as Philadelphia's School of the Future or the Denver School of Science and Technology. These campuses, both constructed within the last few years, build in "line-of-sight" hallways but also have abundant space allowing for free movement for students and shifting the paradigm from self-contained classrooms to airier, roomier "learning zones" where collaborative learning communities can occur in smaller, more flexible groups of students. Although it is unlikely that combining surveillance and a pedagogy of discipline will be completely removed from school design, an argument can be made for the potentially enlightened growth of an integrated disciplinary and learning network with seamless integration of security design.

CRITIQUES AND CONCLUSIONS ON FOUCAULT AND REGIMES OF POWER

One of the central points of Foucault's discussion of the discipline and punish system is that the form of discipline associated with the modern prison is not confined to the prison system, but penetrates through society and that society, overall, acquires carceral textures. The mechanisms of social control, psychological

examination, and classification operate within many the institutions that Foucault cited, such as schools and hospitals (1995, p. 199). Indeed, power in its various regulatory forms flows through all of them. Prisons serve as the model for these other institutions not because of architectural similarities, but because of similar (dys?)functionality. It would be simplistic, and probably unfair, to criticize schools because of their focus on control, discipline, and regulation. These features can contribute to the creation of a solid social fabric. Indeed, many of Foucault's ideas on the struggle for self-freedom against forms of control and discipline have been criticized by some as extreme and anarchic.

In support of this, Said (1986) noted that, "Foucault seemed to have been confused between the power of institutions to subjugate individuals, and the fact that individual behavior in society is frequently a matter of following rules of conventions" (p. 151) and, in an essay, entitled *The Politics of Michel Foucault*, Walzer (cited in Hoy 1986) continued the criticism of Foucault's theory as over-extending the role of discipline in everyday life. He said, "So we all live to a time schedule, get up to an alarm, work to a rigid routine, live in the eye of authority, are periodically subject to examination and inspection. No one is entirely free from these new forms of social control. It has to be added, however, that subjection to these new forms is not the same thing as being in prison: Foucault tends to systematically underestimate the difference, and this criticism . . . goes to the heart of his politics." (Hoy 1986, 59)

This last statement speaks to the issue of why an institution (like a school) and, by extension, society may need traditions, rules, and customs not so much to enslave people but to safeguard them. In one sense, individuals need to be protected from the damage that they can inflict upon each other. Foucault's anger at the restrictive, destructive nature of power needs to be tempered by a realization that some societies have flourished when there is a hierarchy of power in place, for example, as occurred in pharaonic Egypt or medieval Europe. Although some might feel that this power balance inevitably tips in favor of the ruling class, it does work to avert a permanent state of chaos. So, although architecture may serve as a visual reminder of potential imbalance in society, it also serves to strengthen the notion that it is the power of ideas that is the real force underpinning these structures. It is interesting to note that Foucault's views on the suppressive capacity of society as well as other related ideas is, at present, being subject to reevaluation. In his book *Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge*, Paras (2006) casts some doubt on the extent of Foucault's resistance to power, the issue by which Foucault was most defined. Paras (2006) claimed that Foucault began to find this notion suffocating and monolithic. This paradigm shift occurred because Foucault "had come to believe that such pre-Christian, pagan approaches to the idea of self-cultivation represented a valuable heuristic—a means to overcome the deficiencies of modern conceptions of the self. [Also] the term 'power/knowledge' itself is entirely absent from his later lectures and texts—a telling indication

of how radically dissatisfied Foucault had become with the limitations of his earlier approach” (Wolin 2006) As Paras continued to dissect Foucault’s later writings and thoughts, he proposed that Foucault evolved into an almost neo-humanist, embracing ideas about freedom, liberty, and individualism, ideas that were, in general, anathema to his earlier, formative thinking. From an avowed visual resistance approach, he seemed to turn to aesthetic self-cultivation. The evolved Foucault now stated, “What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life.... But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?” (Foucault 1983, 236). On this rather astonishing development in Foucault’s philosophical life, Wolin (2006) wrote,

Thereby, Foucault’s work seems to have come full circle. Under the sign of aesthetic self-realization, Foucault rehabilitates and vindicates the rights of subjectivity. As Foucault avows, his new normative ideal is “the formation and development of a practice of Self, the objective of which is the constitution of oneself as the laborer of the beauty of one’s own life.” (B12)

Foucault’s ideas continue to provoke debate, and whether they will make sustained inroads into practices that apply to the governance of schools is, indeed, an open question. He may eventually take his place alongside other highly-regarded educational philosophers such as Piaget, Dewey, or Vygotsky if schools perceive a buy-in to his conceptual analysis of power and its construction. As schools continue to discourse about effective methodologies to ensure that their campus environments meet benchmarked security procedures, the Biloxi model cited at the beginning of this article might become the architectural norm rather than the exception. How far the general public will go in this fragile balancing game between privacy and personal safety is something that will be both interesting and telling to watch, providing a window into the precise level of remaking of school in twenty-first century society allied within a post-Foucauldian philosophy.

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